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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Timothy Lamont Gray appeals from the order revoking his probation. The district court
decided to revoke probation after conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding Mr. Gray had
violated two conditions of his probation: a rule contained in a document entitled Wisconsin
Rules of Supervision, and a term purportedly contained in an Idaho Department of Correction
Agreement of Supervision.
On appeal, Mr. Gray asserts three alternative grounds for reversing the revocation order:
(1) the district court erred in finding that a probation violation had occurred, because the State
failed to establish that the rules Mr. Gray violated were in fact conditions of Mr. Gray's
continued probation; (2) the district court's violated Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) by revoking
probation without an express finding that Mr. Gray's probation violation was willful; and (3) the
district court erred in finding "good cause" for denying Mr. Gray his right to confront witnesses
and in allowing the State to introduce unreliable documentary and hearsay evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 19, 2016, the district court entered an order placing Mr. Gray on probation.
(R., pp.96-100.) Later that same month, Mr. Gray's supervision was transferred to the state of
Wisconsin. (R., p.101.) Nearly three years later, on February 14, 2019, the State of Idaho
("State") filed an Interstate Compact Report of Violation ("Report of Violation") in the district
court, alleging that, based on conduct reported by his Wisconsin probation officer, Mr. Gray was
in violation of his probation for having violated two rules of an Idaho Department of Correction
Agreement of Supervision ("IDOC Agreement.") (R., pp.102-03.)

1

1.

The State's Allegations

In its Report of Violation, the State alleged there were two "rules violated" and set forth
four specific provisions. 1 (R., p.101) Under the heading, "1) RULE VIOLATED," the Report
ofViolation set forth three provisions:
COURT ORDER[ED] TERMS AND CONDITIONS (1), which states: "The
probation is granted to and accepted by the probationer, subject to all the terms
and conditions specified in the Conditions of Probation and the Department of
Correction Agreement of Supervision, which must be obeyed, a copy of which is
attached hereto and made part hereof by their reference, and with the
understanding that the Court may at any time, in case of violation of the terms of
probation, cause the probationer to be returned to the Court for the imposition of
sentence as prescribed by law."
IDAHO
DEPARTMENT
OF
CORRECTION
AGREEMENT
OF
SUPERVISION (4), which states: Firearms and Weapons: "The probationer
will not purchase, carry, posses, or have control of any firearms, chemical
weapons, electronic weapons, explosives, or other weapons. Any weapons or
firearms seized may be forfeited to the Department of Correction for disposal.
The probationer will not reside at any location where firearms are present."
IDAHO
DEPARTMENT
OF
CORRECTION
AGREEMENT
OF
SUPERVISION (14), which states: Intrastate/Interstate Violations: "If allowed
to transfer supervision to another district or state, the defendant agrees to accept
any violation allegation documents purportedly submitted by the agency/officer
supervising the defendant in the receiving district or state as admissible into
evidence as credible and reliable. The defendant waives any right to confront the
author of such documents."
(R., pp. IO 1-02; Exhibits, pp.262-63 (Ex.A). )2
In the "summary" of the violation, the State alleged that, "according to a report of
violation submitted by Wisconsin Probation and Parole Officer, Christine Riggs," Mr. Gray had
texted his sisters and friends inquiring about guns and indicated his intent to buy a gun when he

1

At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the State clarified that its written report contained four
different rules but alleged just two rule violations. (Tr., p.16, Ls.8-10.)
2
Citations to "Exhibits" refer to electronic file titled "Modified Exhibits," and contains the
documentary evidence admitted at the held June 18, 2019 probation revocation evidentiary
hearing, marked as State's Exhibits "A" - "H."
2

got paid. (R., p.101.) Mr. Gray also reportedly remarked, during an argument with his employer
about missing hours from his paycheck, that he would go "find a gun and come see if he would
miss [the employer's] head." (R., p.102.)
Under the heading, "2) RULE VIOLATED," the State set forth one provision:
IDAHO
DEPARTMENT
OF
CORRECTION
AGREEMENT
OF
SUPERVISION (12), which states: Evaluation and Program Plan: "The
defendant will obtain any treatment evaluation deemed necessary as ordered by
the Court or requested by any agent of the Department of Correction. Defendant
will meaningfully participate in and successfully complete any treatment,
counseling or other programs deemed beneficial as directed by the Court or agent
of the Department of Correction."
(R., p.102; Exhibits, p.262.)
In the "summary" of this violation, the State alleged that, "according to a report of
violation submitted by Wisconsin Probation and Parole Officer, Christine Riggs," Ms. Riggs
received an email on May 14, 2018, reporting an event involving Mr. Gray that had occurred
"after group" that resulted in Mr. Gray's behavioral discharge from services and a
recommendation for anger management treatment. (R., p.102.)
The State asserted in its Report of Violation that, if the violations were proved, the State
would seek to revoke Mr. Gray's probation. (R., p.103; Exhibits, p.263.) Citing these two Rule
Violations, the State also requested a nationwide arrest warrant, which the district court issued,
and Mr. Gray was returned to Idaho and brought before the district court. (R., pp.104, 156.)
Mr. Gray denied he had violated his probation conditions and the district court set the matter for
a probation revocation evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.153-54.)

2.

The Probation Revocation Evidentiary Hearing

The probation revocation hearing was conducted in two phases: an evidentiary hearing,
which tasked the State with proving the probation violations it alleged had occurred (Tr., p.6, L.3

3

- p.47, L.17), and a disposition hearing to determine whether Mr. Gray's probation should be
revoked or reinstated. (Tr., p.48, L.5 - p.57, L.15.) At the evidentiary hearing, the State offered
to prove Mr. Gray's probation violations using solely the documents purportedly submitted by
Mr. Gray's Wisconsin probation officer. (Tr., p.6, L.10 - p.7, L.12; R., p.101.) The State made
an oral "proffer" that "this is an interstate compact case," and claimed that Mr. Gray had waived
his due process right to confront witnesses or challenge the documents. (Tr., p.6, L. l 0 - p. 7,
L.12; R., p.101.) The State pointed to the language ofa purported "waiver" provision which was
"outlined" in its Report of Violation, and argued these facts provided "good cause" for denying
Mr. Gray the opportunity to confront the witnesses who made the statements against him.
Mr. Gray objected. (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-13.) He asserted that allowing the written statements,
without providing him an opportunity to confront the witnesses, violated his due process rights,
as a probationer, to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Gray
argued the State had not established good cause for depriving him of that right, noting the State's
failure to prove the existence of the alleged IDOC agreement, or of any other agreement,
containing the purported confrontation waiver clause, and that the State had not otherwise
demonstrated that Mr. Gray had voluntarily waived his constitutional right.

(Tr., p.8, Ls.14-22;

p.39, Ls.60-14.) Mr. Gray also objected to the written statements on the ground they represented
layers of hearsay and did not possess requisite hallmarks of reliability or accuracy, especially
since not one of the statements, including those made by the Wisconsin probation officer, was
sworn. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-19, p.42, Ls.1-23; Exhibits).
The district court overruled all of Mr. Gray's objections. (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-25; p.21, Ls.38.) The district court specifically found that Mr. Gray had made a "knowing waiver" of his
rights to confront "as a term of acceptance for the interstate compact" which provided "good

4

cause" for denying Mr. Gray the opportunity to confront the witnesses or to otherwise challenge
the reliability of the State's evidence. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-13.)
The State introduced its documentary evidence through an Idaho Department of
Correction employee, Michael Alboucq, 3 who testified he had no personal knowledge of
Mr. Gray, or his supervision in Wisconsin, independent of the information in those documents.
(Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.4.) The State did not present a copy of the alleged IDOC Agreement or
a copy of any other agreement entered between Mr. Gray and the Idaho Department of
Correction. (See generally Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.17; Exhibits, pp.261-76.) Nor did it offer
testimony of anyone with personal knowledge that Mr. Gray had ever entered such agreement.
(See generally Tr., p.6, L.3 -p.47, L.17.)

The State did introduce a copy the Wisconsin Department of Corrections' "Rules of
Supervision," purportedly signed and acknowledged by Mr. Gray.

(See Exhibits, pp.264-65

(Ex.B).)
During the cross-examination of Mr. Alboucq, it became clear there was no evidence that
Mr. Gray had ever purchased, carried, possessed, or controlled a firearm, and that the evidence
was therefore insufficient to prove the State's alleged violation of Rule 4 of the IDOC
Agreement. (See Tr., p.28, L.14 - p.5, L.22.) On re-direct, the State suggested that Mr. Gray's
conduct could be a violation the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision, specifically ST00l (Tr., p.12,
12-19; Exhibits, pp.264-65 (Ex.B).) That Wisconsin rule provides:
ST 001. Avoid all conduct which is in violation of federal or state statute,
municipal or county ordinances, tribal law or which is not in the best interest of
the public welfare or your rehabilitation.
(Exhibits, p.264 (Ex.B) (hereinafter, "Wisconsin Rule 001. ")
3

The record does not disclose in what capacity Mr. Alboucq was employed, only that he had
worked for the Department since 2007. (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-24.)
5

Mr. Gray objected on due process grounds, arguing that this new rule violation was not
one the State had alleged, and was therefore not a violation he had prepared to defend against.
(Tr., p.32, L.18 - p.33, L.16.) Over Mr. Gray's further objections, the State introduced a
document purporting be a Wisconsin Department of Corrections' "Notice of Probable Cause
Hearing," notifying Mr. Gray that his Wisconsin probation officer had made a request to the
State ofldaho to retake him, because he violated the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision, including
STOOL (Tr., p.32, L.18 -p.33, L.16; Exhibits, p.275 (Ex.H).) According to the State, this notice
provided Mr. Gray with constitutionally-adequate notice of the violation the State was now
claiming. (Tr., p.33, Lsl-16.)
3.

District Court's Findings Of Probation Violations

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court made the following
findings regarding the alleged probation violations.
a.

The District Court Found The Alleged Violation Of Rule 4 Of The IDOC
Agreement Had Not Been Proved

Regarding the State's allegation that Mr. Gray violated the "firearms and weapons"
condition, Rule 4, forbidding him to "purchase, carry, possess, or have control" of a gun, the
district court found "that particular rule was not violated."

(Tr., p.44, Ls.14-22 (emphasis

added).) The State conceded the failure of proof as well. 4 (Tr., p.28, Ls.14-19, p.36, Ls.14-25).
b.

The District Court Instead Found A Violation Of STOOL Of The
Wisconsin Rules Of Supervision

At the State's urging, the district found Mr. Gray in violation Wisconsin Rule STOOL
(Tr., p.45, Ls.19-16.) Quoting the language of the Wisconsin Rule, the district court explained

4

This concession binds the State on appeal. See State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017).
6

that rule was an "overarching rule over everything that a defendant should avoid conduct which
is in violation of federal or state statute, et cetera, and not in the best interest of the public
welfare or your rehabilitation." (Tr., p.44, L.23 - p.45, L.16 (emphasis added); Exhibits, p.104

(Ex.B).) The district court went on to find that, while there was no evidence that Mr. Gray had
purchased a firearm, there was evidence he was "making positive steps to acquire a firearm,
which caused concern" and "I find those acts are clearly in violation of that [Wisconsin Rule
001]." (Tr., p.45, Ls.5-16.)
c.

The District Court Found A Violation Of Rule 12 Of The IDOC
Agreement As Alleged

The district court also found, "based on what happened when Mr. Gray was terminated
from his treatment" on May 14, 2018, that Mr. Gray violated Rule 12, of the IDOC Agreement.
(Tr., p.46, Ls.1-12; Exhibits, p.262-63 (Ex.A).) According to the State's Report of Violation,
that rule required a probationer to "participate in" and "successfully complete" the recommended
treatment and programming. (Tr., p.46, Ls.1-12; Exhibits, pp.262-63 (Ex.A).) The district court
additionally found Mr. Gray had "engaged in acts that caused great concern for those there
during the termination" and had made "threatening statements," as further support for finding
this violation. (Tr., p.46, Ls.1-12.)
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court stated, "I do find that
Mr. Gray has violated the terms of his probation under those rules" (Tr., p.46, Ls.9-12); however,
the district court made no finding that Mr. Gray's violations had been "willful." (See generally
Tr., p.43, L.6 - p.46, L.18.)
4.

The Disposition Hearing

7

At the subsequent disposition hearing, Mr. Gray asked the district court to continue his
probation with added treatment for his under-addressed mental health condition. (Tr. p.50, L.5 p.54, L.4.) The district court denied Mr. Gray's request and instead revoked his probation,
retained jurisdiction, and ordered Mr. Gray to complete a rider. (Tr., p.56, L.6 - p.57, L.1 O;
R., pp.163-65.)

The district court made no finding at the disposition hearing, or in any

subsequent order, that Mr. Gray had "willfully" violated the conditions of his probation. (See
generally Tr., p.48, L.5 -p.57, L.19; R., pp.101, 163-65.)

6.

Appeal

Mr. Gray filed a Notice of Appeal that is timely from the district court's order revoking
his probation. (R., p.166.)

8

ISSUES
I.

Should the revocation order be reversed, because the State failed to carry its burden of
proving that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his probation?

II.

Should the revocation order be reversed, because the district court erroneously revoked
Mr. Gray's probation without expressly finding that Mr. Gray's probation violation was
"willful"?

III.

Should the order revoking probation be reversed, because the evidence used to support
the finding of the violation was admitted in violation of Mr. Gray's due process right to
confront and cross examine adverse witnesses?

9

ARGUMENTS
I.
The Revocation Order Should Be Reversed Because The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of
Proving That Mr. Gray Violated A Condition Of His Probation

A.

Introduction
Before at trial court may revoke a probationer's probation, the trial court must find that

the probationer willfully violated a condition of his probation. State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708,
712 (2017). The burden of proving a probation violation rests squarely with the State, and in
establishing a violation the State is required to comply with the probationer's due process rights.

State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765 (2007). In Mr. Gray's case, the State failed to carry that
burden. As demonstrated below, the State failed to establish that the rules Mr. Gray was found
to have violated - Rule ST00l of the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision, and Rule 12 of the IDOC
Agreement - were in fact conditions ofMr. Gray's continued probation.

B.

Standards Applicable On Review
As noted above, a trial court may not revoke a probationer's probation unless the State

proves, and the court finds, that the probationer willfully violated a condition of his probation.
I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; I.C.R. 33(f); State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 712 (2017); State v.

Clausen, 163 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2017).

Additionally, because a probationer has a

protected liberty interest in continuing his probation, his probation may not be revoked unless he
is provided the minimum due process that is required under the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (setting forth the minimum
procedural protections and safeguards due to parolees), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
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(1973) (holding those same requirements apply to probationers). Relevant here, at the revocation
hearing stage, 5 the minimum requirements include the following:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation]; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body
[ ... ]; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking [probation].

See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (1972).
On review of the trial court's decision to revoke a probationer's probation, the trial
court's factual findings, including a finding that a violation has been proved, will be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765. However,
the questions of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied, like other questions of
law, are subject to free review. Id.

C.

The Evidence Is Insufficient To Support A Finding That Mr. Gray Violated The
Conditions Of His Probation
The district court found two violations of Mr. Gray's probation: a violation of Wisconsin

Rule of Supervision ST 001 (which was not alleged by the State in its Report of Violation), and a
violation ofIDOC Rule 12. (Tr., p.45, L.5 - p. 46, L.12.) However, as explained below, neither
rule was established to be a condition of Mr. Gray's continued probation, and therefore neither
violation can support the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gray's probation.
5

The Supreme Court in Morrissey recognized two distinct stages of the revocation proceedings:
the "arrest and preliminary hearing" stage, and the "revocation hearing" stage. 408 U.S. at 489.
The Supreme Court established minimum due process requirements that must be met at each
stage. Id. The due process rights that apply at the "preliminary hearing stage" include the right
to confront adverse witnesses, the right to present witnesses, and, if the probationer denies the
allegations, then a presumptive right to the assistance of counsel. See Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782.
The record of the proceedings held in Wisconsin, though incomplete, indicates that Mr. Gray
was not afforded any of these rights at his preliminary hearing in Wisconsin. (See Exhibits,
p.275 (Ex.H).)
11

1.

The Wisconsin Rule Was Not A Condition Of Mr. Gray's Probation, And A
Violation Of That Rule Is Insufficient To Prove That Mr. Gray Violated His
Probation

The district court erred in finding a probation violation based on Wisconsin Rule of
Supervision ST 001 ("Wisconsin Rule 001"), for two reasons:

(a) the State did not provide

Mr. Gray constitutionally-adequate notice of the violation, and (b) Wisconsin Rule STOOi was
not a condition ofMr. Gray's Idaho probation.

a.

Adequate Notice Was Not Provided

In order to revoke probation, the State was required to provide Mr. Gray "written notice
of the probation violations being claimed," and it was required to provide this notice "at the
probation revocation hearing stage." Brewer, 408 U.S. at 482; Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782.
The State's Report of Violation claimed two "RULES VIOLATED," specifically, two
provisions of an Idaho Department of Correction Agreement of Supervision: Rule 4, relating to
firearms and weapons; and Rule 12, relating to participating in treatment. 6 (R., pp. IO 102.) However, Wisconsin Rule 001, requiring that a probationer "avoid all conduct" which "is
not in the best interest of the public welfare or his rehabilitation," was not among the terms and
conditions the State had alleged Mr. Gray violated.

(See R., pp.101-02.) Thus, even if the

Wisconsin Department of Correction had previously alleged Mr. Gray's conduct was a violation
of his Wisconsin supervision agreement, the State of Idaho provided no notice to Mr. Gray, prior
to the revocation hearing, that it was claiming a violation of that rule as a basis for revoking his
probation. (See R., pp.101-02.) Only after the State had submitted its evidence on the firearms
violation and realized it had failed to establish that violation, did the State first claim that
Mr. Gray violated Rule STOOi of the Wisconsin Rule of supervision. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.12-21.)
6

These same two rule violations were cited by the State as the basis for its request of the
nationwide warrant of arrest. (See R., pp.IOI, 104.)
12

However, "[n ]otice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in
advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be
afforded." See In re Gault, 387 U.S.1, 36 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1968). The State's mid-hearing switch did not comport with the due
process requirement that the State provide Mr. Gray written notice of the violations upon which
it sought to revoke his probation. For this reason, in addition to the reason below, the district
court's finding of a violation of the Wisconsin rule must be vacated.

b.

Wisconsin Rule 001 Was Not Established As Part Of Mr. Gray's Idaho
Probation

Even if the State had claimed a violation of Wisconsin Rule ST 001, the State failed to
carry its burden of proving that Wisconsin Rule ST 001 was a condition of Mr. Gray's Idaho
probation.

Idaho Code §19-2601(2) vests the sentencing court with the authority to set the

substantive terms and conditions of probation. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the
probation order, not a probation agreement, sets the conditions of probation. Franklin v. State,
87 Idaho 291, 296 (1964); State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79, 83 (Ct. App. 2017). The district
court's order of probation in this case contains no provision resembling the Wisconsin Rule 001.
(See R., pp.97-100.)
The terms and conditions of Mr. Gray's probation are set forth in the district court's
original order of probation, entered in April of 2016, following Mr. Gray's rider review. (See at
R., pp.96-100 ("Judgment of Conviction Suspended and Order of Probation").) Within those
court-ordered conditions of probation, there is no "overarching rule" resembling Wisconsin Rule
of Supervision ST 001. (See generally R., pp.96-100.) Nor did the State produce evidence of an
agreement signed by Mr. Gray that purported to acknowledge or accept Wisconsin rule ST 001
as a condition of his Idaho probation. (See generally, R., pp.101-02; Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.17;
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Exhibits, pp.261-76.) On the contrary, Mr. Gray's attorney repeatedly noted that the State had
failed to produce a copy of any interstate agreement, and the record contains no agreement of
supervision between Mr. Gray and the Idaho Department of Correction. (See generally,
R., pp.101-02; Tr., p.6, L.3-p.47, L.17; Exhibits.)
The State bore the burden of establishing that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his
probation, including the burden of showing that Mr. Gray had accepted Wisconsin rule ST 001
as a condition of his probation. Santana, 79 Idaho at 83; see also State v. Klinger, 143 Idaho
493, 496 (2006) (conditions of probation cannot be implied but must be established); State v.
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012) ("burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of

its breach is upon the plaintiff'). The State failed to make that showing.
Because the State failed to establish that Mr. Gray's court-ordered probation was subject
to Wisconsin Rule of Supervision 001, the district court's finding the Wisconsin rule was
violated cannot provide a basis for its decision to revoke his probation.

2.

The District Court's Finding That Mr. Gray Violated IDOC Rule 12 Is Not
Supported By The Evidence And Is Erroneous

The State also failed to carry its burden of proving the second rule violation - Rule 12, of
the IDOC Agreement - was a condition of Mr. Gray's probation, as explained below.

The

district court's finding that Mr. Gray violated that rule is therefore insufficient to support a
finding that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his probation.

a.

The Evidence Is Insufficient To Support Finding A Violation Based On
Rule 12 Of The Purported IDOC Agreement

The evidence is also insufficient to support a finding of the second probation violation,
which was based on a finding that Mr. Gray violated Rule 12 of an IDOC Agreement. (Tr., p.45,
L.17 - p.46, L.12.) As noted above, the State failed to produce the alleged IDOC agreement at
14

the hearing, notwithstanding Mr. Gray's objection that questioned the existence of the
agreement. 7

(Tr., p.8, Ls.14-22.) Although the district court's probation order appears to have

contemplated that Mr. Gray would enter a supervision agreement with the Idaho Department of
Correction (see R., pp.87-98), there is no evidence in the record that such an agreement was in
fact ever entered. (R., pp.96-100; Exhibits, pp.261-75) Rather, and if the State's Report of
Violation is correct, Mr. Gray's supervision was immediately transferred to Wisconsin.

(See

R., p.96 (order of probation signed April 19, 2016); R., pp.IOI, 103 (stating supervision was
transferred in April 2016).) The State did not otherwise establish that Mr. Gray had in fact
entered into any agreement with the Idaho Department of Correction containing the terms and
conditions the State alleged. 8 (See generally, Tr., p.6, L.3 -p.47, L.17; Exhibits (Ex.A).)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the conditions of probation cannot be implied.

Klinger, 143 Idaho at 496.

Idaho's appellate courts have also recognized that probation

agreements and traditional contracts are analogous. See State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257, 261
(2018); State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 750 (Ct. App. 2011) (stating "the terms of probation might
be likened to a contract between the court and the defendant.") Even in criminal cases, as with
any contractual dispute, the "burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of its
breach is upon the plaintiff." Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257; accord State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho

7

In the district court, both parties referred to the provisions of the alleged IDOC agreement as
"the interstate compact agreement." (See Tr., p.7, Ls.15-18, p.8, Ls.14-22.) (Ex.A).) However,
there are no references to any provisions of an "Interstate compact agreement" anywhere in the
State's Report of Violation, and no evidence of an Interstate compact agreement was presented
in this case. (See generally R., pp. IO 1-02.)
8
As noted above, the Report of Violation, signed and sworn by Idaho probation officer Carmon
Dyas, does not allege that Mr. Gray had ever entered into a supervision agreement with the Idaho
Department of Correction (see Exhibits, pp.261-63 (Ex.A)), and the State's only live witness, the
Department's employee, Mr. Alboucq, did not testify to the existence such an agreement. (See
generally Tr., p.14, L.3 -p.34, L.20.)
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593, 595 (2010) ("The burden of proving a contract, whether express or implied, is on the party
asserting it, and he must prove each essential fact, including the existence of a mutual intent.")
The State's burden of proving that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his probation
necessarily includes the burden of proving the existence of the condition allegedly violated. See
Klinger, 143 Idaho at 496 (holding that conditions of probation cannot be implied.) The State

failed to carry that burden. As demonstrated above, the State did not produce a copy of the
IDOC Agreement containing the rule purportedly violated or offer testimony that Mr. Gray in
fact entered such an agreement. (See generally, Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.17; Exhibits.) Thus, even
if the evidence was sufficient to prove the conduct the State had alleged, the evidence was
insufficient to prove that a probation violation occurred because the evidence was insufficient to
prove the existence of the condition allegedly violated.

b.

The Evidence Is Insufficient To Support A Finding That Mr. Gray
Violated The Court-Ordered Condition Of Probation That Required Him
To "Participate In" Treatment

In the absence of an Idaho probation agreement, the only terms and conditions of
Mr. Gray's probation are those ordered by the district court. See Franklin, 87 Idaho at 296;
Santana, 162 Idaho at 83. The Report of Violation that the State filed in this case did not allege

that Mr. Gray violated any of the special terms or conditions of his court-ordered probation, only
that he violated the terms of the IDOC Agreement. (See R., pp.101-02.) Accordingly, Mr. Gray
asserts the State did not provide him with constitutionally-adequate notice of any other violation.
However, assuming arguendo, that the Report's allegations, under the heading, "2) RULE
VIOLATED" provided notice that the State was claiming a violation of the court-ordered
condition requiring the probationer to "participate in" treatment, i.e., Rule 9 of the Conditions of
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Probation (R., p.100), the State's evidence of Mr. Gray's conduct is insufficient to establish a
violation of that condition.
Rule 9 of the Conditions of Probation provides,
Probationer shall participate in any mental health, drug/alcohol abuse program,
vocational [re ]habilitation, educational or learning program as recommended by
his/her probation officer and pay costs of such programs.
(R., p.100.)
The State's allegation and evidence that a probation violation occurred is based
exclusively on an event9 that allegedly took place May 14, 2018, "after group." (R., p.101;
Exhibits 262 (Ex.A, C).) The event was reported in an email from Walter Laux, of The Bridge
Health Clinics & Research Centers, addressed to Mr. Gray's Wisconsin probation officer
Christine Riggs.

(R., p.101; Exhibits 262 (Ex.A, C).)

As demonstrated below, the facts

contained in that email, even if true, are insufficient to establish a violation of Condition of
Probation Rule 9.
The incident allegedly happened in the reception area, "after group," whereby Mr. Gray
approached the receptionist, said "bus ticket," and when he was told to wait, Mr. Gray loudly hit
the wall near the receptionist; the receptionist told Mr. Gray he was "rude and disrespectful" and
Mr. Gray began pacing back and forth near the receptionist. (Exhibits, p. 266 (Ex.C).) The
facilitator intervened and explained to Mr. Gray his behavior was "inappropriate." (Exhibits,
p.266 (Ex.C).) According to the email, Mr. Gray did not respond and, upon receiving his bus
ticket, he immediately left the building. (Exhibits, p. 266 (Ex.C) (emphasis added.)

9

Other than this event, the State's allegations and evidence concern conduct that occurred on or
after December of 2018, which is seven months after Mr. Gray was reportedly "discharged from
services at the Bridge." (See Exhibits, Exhibits 261-68 (Ex.A, C,D, E).)
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The email also states that Mr. Gray's "relapse plan was [left] on his chair and completely
blank."

(Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).)

The facilitator then staffed the event with the clinical

supervisor, who recommended a behavioral discharge, and Mr. Gray was "discharged from
services at Bridges." (Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).) Mr. Gray was recommended for referral to anger
management, which Mr. Laux stated "was more pressing" and that he, Mr. Laux, had "in fact
mentioned this to him again in group that day." (Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).)
These facts are insufficient to establish a violation of Condition of Probation Rule 9, for
several reasons. First, the Rule requires that the probationer "participate in" treatment; it does
not require that he successfully complete it.

(See R., p.100.)

The email evidence shows

Mr. Gray was in "group" that day, and that he was discharged as a result of the incident that
occurred after group, in the reception area. (Tr., p.19, Ls.7-20; Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).) Thus,
even if his discharge meant Mr. Gray could not complete whatever services he was receiving at
The Bridge, his discharge is not evidence that Mr. Gray did not participate in the recommended
programming, and therefore does not provide substantial evidence of a violation of the court's
condition. Moreover, the email recommends that Mr. Gray be referred to alternative services,
and there is no evidence he did not participate in such alternative programming. (See generally,
Tr., p.6, L.3 -p.47, L.17; Exhibits.)
Additionally, and to the extent the district court found Mr. Gray had "engaged in acts that
caused great concern for those there during the termination," and "made some threatening
statements as well," in connection with his discharge on May 14, 2018, (see Tr., p.46, Ls.3-5), 10
the finding is not supported by the record, is clearly erroneous, and must be set aside.
10

See

It appears the district conflated the information contained in a different email, dated December
10, 2018, which made reference to threatening statements. (See Exhibits, p.267 (Ex.D).)
However, that evidence has no bearing on Mr. Gray's discharge from treatment, seven months
earlier, in May of 2018.
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Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814 (1994) (holding that findings not supported by the record are
clearly erroneous and must be set aside). A review of the State's Exhibit C reveals no evidence
of any statements by Mr. Gray, other than "bus ticket" associated with this reported event. (See
Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).) To the contrary, the email explicitly states that Mr. Gray "did not
respond, and immediately left the building." (Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).)
The only information that arguably relates to Mr. Gray's "participation in" treatment was
that, when Mr. Gray left "group," his "relapse plan was on his chair and completely blank."
(Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).) However, the email contains no evidence which indicates the relevance
ofleaving his relapse plan on a chair, or leaving it blank. (See generally Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).)
There is no evidence in the email that participants were required to leave completed treatment
plans on chairs (or to leave blank plans somewhere other than on chairs). There is no evidence
of showing what the facilitator expected, or had instructed, regarding Mr. Gray's relapse plan.
See generally Exhibits, p.266 (Ex.C).) Absent evidence that shows the relevance of leaving a
blank report on the chair, the bare fact Mr. Gray had done so is insufficient to establish Mr. Gray
did not participate in the recommended programming, and therefore insufficient to establish a
violation of Rule 9, of the Conditions of Probation. The information in the email does not show
that Mr. Gray failed to "submit to" or "participate in" recommended programming.
Moreover, Mr. Alboucq's testimony about his own reactions and opinions regarding the
contents of the email does not provide sufficient proof of a violation.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.1-13.)

Mr. Alboucq did not supervise Mr. Gray and, aside from the information contained in the email,
Exhibit C, he had no personal knowledge about what treatment had been recommended for
Mr. Gray or his performance in that programming. (See generally Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.24.)
Mr. Alboucq's "interpretation" of Exhibit C as meaning Mr. Gray was at the "end of treatment"
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and had "submitted" a blank treatment plan as part of his exit (Tr., p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.13), is
pure conjecture and speculation. It does not constitute substantial evidence and is insufficient to
support a finding that Mr. Gray violated the condition of probation requiring him to "participate
in" recommended treatment programs.

D.

On Remand, Mr. Gray Is Entitled To Reinstatement Of His Probation
The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Mr. Gray violated his probation

based on the violations found by the district court, or on any other violation for which the State
arguably provided constitutionally-adequate notice.

Because the evidence is insufficient to

support a finding that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his probation, the district court's order
revoking Mr. Gray's probation must be reversed and his case must be remanded to the district
court. On remand, Mr. Gray is entitled to reinstatement of his probation.

II.
The District Court Erroneously Revoked Mr. Gray's Probation Without Expressly Finding That
Mr. Gray's Probation Violation Was "Willful"
A.

Introduction
A trial court is prohibited from revoking probation unless the trial court first finds that

that probationer willfully violated a condition of his probation. I.C.R. 33(f); Garner, 161 Idaho
at 712; Clausen, 163 Idaho at 184. Under the clear language of Rule 33(f), in accordance with
the dictates of Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 782 and Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 778, the trial court's finding
of "willfulness" must be express and made on the record. The district court in this case failed to
articulate any fmding that Mr. Gray's probation violation was willful, and its decision to revoke
Mr. Gray's probation must therefore be vacated as an abuse of discretion.
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Moreover, because the State did not allege or argue that Mr. Gray's probation violation
was willful in the proceedings held in the district court, the State is not now entitled to another
chance to do so on remand. Mr. Gray is therefore entitled to reinstatement of his probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where the trial court has correctly determined that a probationer has violated the

conditions of his probation, the trial court has discretion to decide whether to revoke probation or
whether to reinstate it. Garner, 161 Idaho at 71 O; Clausen, 163 Idaho at 182. When the exercise
of that discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court engages in a multi-tier inquiry to
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114 (2018).

C.

The District Court Erred In Revoking Probation Absent An Express Finding That
Mr. Gray Willfully Violated A Condition Of His Probation
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) expressly provides:
The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant
or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated
a condition of probation.

(Emphasis added.)
By adopting Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f), the Supreme Court could not have been more
emphatic or clear that, unless the probationer actually admits to a willful violation, there must be
an express finding by the district court that the probationer willfully violated the probation
condition. Rule 33(f) requires a trial court to make the finding, affirmatively, in order to revoke
probation. This requirement that there be a finding made cannot be satisfied by an after-the-fact
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gleaning of the record on appeal for evidence that could have supported a finding of willfulness,
had such a fmding been made. A reading of Rule 33(f) that permits willfulness to be presumed
or inferred from the fact of revocation, without requiring that the court actually make a
"finding," would circumvent and undermine the plain language and intent of the Rule, that the
trial court "shall not revoke probation unless there is ... a finding by the court" that the defendant
willfully violated a condition of probation.

I.C.R. 33(f) (emphasis added).

Had the Idaho

Supreme Court intended the requisite willfulness fmding to be inferred after-the-fact, the
Supreme Court would have written Rule 33(f) differently.
The requirement of an express fmding of willfulness is also supported by the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Garner, which holds that "probation may only be revoked if the
defendant's violation was willful." 161 Idaho at 712 (emphasis added). In Garner, the Court
upheld the district court's decision to revoke probation where the district court had made, in an
amended order, "an express finding that Gamer was in willful violation of [the] terms of his
probation." and its fmding of willfulness was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.
at 712 (emphasis added).
In contrast to Garner, the district court in the present case articulated no fmding that
Mr. Gray's probation violation was "willful" - not at the evidentiary hearing (see Tr., p.46, L.5 p.46, L.12), or the disposition hearing (see Tr., p.54, L.16- p.57, L.10), or in its subsequent
written order (R., p.163).

Additionally, because the State did not allege that the probation

violation had been willful, the district court's fmding that the State had proved its allegations
does not equate to a fmding that the violation was willful.
Moreover, reading Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) to require that the trial court make an
express fmding, on the record, is also necessary to comply with Mr. Gray's due process rights as
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a probationer.

Under the controlling United States Supreme Court authority, Mr. Gray was

entitled to "a written statement 11 by the factfmders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking" probation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482; Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782. Because a fmding

that the probation violation was "willful" is always and necessarily a "reason" for revoking
probation, a probationer's due process rights also require that this fmding be express and made
on the record.
The district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gray's probation is inconsistent with the
applicable legal standard requiring that the court "must not revoke probation unless there is ... a
finding by the court" that the probationer "willfully violated a condition of probation," and

represents an abuse of discretion. The decision should be vacated.
D.

On Remand, The State Is Not Entitled To Additional Fact-Finding; Mr. Gray Is Entitled
To Reinstatement Of Probation
In the district court, the State failed to allege or argue that Mr. Gray's probation

violations were willful, and the district court failed to make the requisite fmding on its own. (See
R., pp.101-02; Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.17). Having forfeited its opportunity to carry its burden in
the district court, the State is not entitled now to a second chance to do so. See State v. Hoskins,
165 Idaho 217, _, 443 P.3d 231, 240 (2019) (rejecting the State's request for a remand to
determine the application of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, where the State had failed to
argue any exception in the district court).

On remand, Mr. Gray is entitled to reinstatement of

his probation.

11

The district court need not enter written fmdings to satisfy this requirement, but the requisite
findings must be stated on the record. See State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 153 (1983).
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III.
The Order Revoking Probation Should Be Reversed Because The Evidence Used To Support
The Finding Of The Violation Was Admitted In Violation Of Mr. Gray's Due Process Right To
Confront And Cross Examine Adverse Witnesses

A.

Introduction
Among the constitutional rights guaranteed a probationer facing revocation of his

probation, is the right to confront and cross-examme adverse witnesses, unless the court
"specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 782;

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782; State v. White, 158 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2015).

In this case,

Mr. Gray's right to confront was violated because the district court allowed the State to prove its
case using documentary and hearsay evidence without permitting Mr. Gray the opportunity to
confront the witnesses, despite the objections of his attorney. (See Tr., p.11, Ls.1-13.) The
district court found that Mr. Gray had knowingly waived his right to confront by entering an
interstate compact agreement, as well as his right to challenge the reliability of the documentary
evidence, but the finding of a waiver is not supported by the record and is clearly erroneous.
(Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.44, L. 13.) The district court also found good cause for denying Mr. Gray his
confrontation rights based on the distance between the states. (Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.44, L.13.)
Because the objected-to documentary and hearsay statements provide the sole evidentiary
support for the finding that the probation violations occurred, those fmdings must be vacated,
and the district court's order revoking Mr. Gray's probation must also be vacated.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of the trial court's decision to revoke probation, the trial court's factual

findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. Rose, 144
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Idaho at 765. However, the questions of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied,
like other questions of law, are subject to free review. Id.
C.

The Record Does Not Support A Finding That Mr. Gray Made A Knowing Waiver Of
His Due Process Right To Confront Adverse Witnesses, And The District Court Erred In
Allowing The State To Prove The Violations Using Documentary And Hearsay
Evidence, Without Good Cause For Denying Mr. Gray The Opportunity To Confront The
Witnesses
Mr. Gray objected to the admission of the State's documentary and hearsay evidence,

asserting his constitutional right and desire to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who
purportedly made the statements against him.

(Tr., p.8, Ls.14-22; p.39, Ls.60-14.) The district

court overruled Mr. Gray's objections, finding that Mr. Gray had made a "knowing waiver" of
his rights to confront "as a term of acceptance for the interstate compact" which provided "good
cause" for denying Mr. Gray the opportunity to confront the witnesses or to otherwise challenge
the reliability of State's evidence. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-13.) Later, the district court stated:
The Court does make the specific finding, and I believe I did so on the objections
also, that there is good cause for the hearing to go forward today based on the fact
that this is an interstate compact case, that the state in question is Wisconsin, that
it appears Mr. Gray was advised that he would waive certain rights by agreeing
to the interstate compact, including the right to maybe make those challenges that
anything that was submitted through interstate compact in exchange of his
privilege of being able to leave the State of Idaho and reside there, that the Court
could consider reports coming out of Wisconsin. And based on the distance
between the states, I do find that good cause exists for the consideration of those
matters.
(Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.44, L.13.)
The district court's finding of good cause is not supported by the record and is clearly
erroneous. First, the record does not support the district court's finding that Mr. Gray made a
knowing waiver of his due process right to confront adverse witnesses. Second, the "distance
between the states," standing alone, does not outweigh Mr. Gray's right to confront the
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witnesses, especially where the State's documentary evidence admitted in lieu of providing live
testimony was unswom and bore none of the requisite indicia of reliability.
1.

No Valid Waiver Was Demonstrated

The State bore the burden of demonstrating that Mr. Gray voluntarily waived his due
process rights, and the State failed to carry that burden. 12 As pointed out by Mr. Gray in the
district court (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-22, p.39, Ls.3-22), there was insufficient evidence of the existence
of any agreement entered into by Mr. Gray containing the purported "waiver" clause.

(See

generally, R., pp.101-02; Tr., p.6, L.3 -p.47, L.17; Exhibits.) The State did not introduce a copy
of any agreement containing the alleged waiver provision, and there was no sworn statement or
other documentary evidence showing that Mr. Gray was ever informed of the waiver provision
when his supervision was transferred to Wisconsin. (See generally, R., pp.101-02; Tr., p.6, L.3 p.4 7, L.17; Exhibits.) The prosecutor's unswom oral proffer that "this is an interstate compact
case" (see Tr., p.6, Ls. I 0-16), is not evidence of an interstate compact agreement. See State v.

Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 696 (2016) (holding that"[u ]nswom oral or written representations,
even those of an officer of the court, are not evidence.")
Nor did Mr. Alboucq's testimony establish that Mr. Gray had been informed of and
agreed to voluntarily waive his right to confront.

Mr. Alboucq's testified only that it was

"common with interstate compact agreements that a defendant waive [the] right to confront," and
that a waiver is "usually" a requirement for probation to be transferred. (Tr., p.26, Ls.13-20).

12

The State bears a heavy burden of proving a waiver of constitutional rights, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), and there is a "heavy presumption against the validity of
waivers." Moran v. Burbind, 475 U.S. 412, 450 (1986); see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822,
834 n.11 (2008) ("constitutional rights, including due process rights, may be waived if such
waiver is affirmatively demonstrated" but "there is a presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights.")
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However, Mr. Alboucq did not testify that there existed an agreement or document signed by
Mr. Gray containing the waiver clause. (See generally, Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.17.) Nor did the

author of the State's Report of Violation, Carmon Dyas, allege in his sworn filing that Mr. Gray
had been informed of, or had agreed to, the terms of an agreement containing the purported
confrontation waiver clause.

(See generally Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.47, L.17; Exhibits, pp.261-63

(Ex.A).)
Accordingly, and contrary to the district court's findings, the record contains insufficient
evidence to establish that Mr. Gray "made a knowing waiver" of his constitutional right to
confront witnesses.

(Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.44, L.13.)

The district court's finding is clearly

erroneous and must be set aside. See Stuart, 127 Idaho at 813-14 (holding that clearly erroneous
factual findings must be set aside and cannot be used to support the trial court's decision).
2. The "Distance Between The States" Was Not Shown To Out-Weigh Mr. Gray's Right
To Confront Witnesses
The district court's additional finding of "the distance between the states," even if a
legitimate reason for not producing the witnesses (Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.44, L. 13), cannot provide
good cause for denying Mr. Gray his right to confront and cross examine those witnesses about
their statements. See State v. Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App.1998). As the Idaho Court
of Appeals explained in Farmer, once the district court has found the State provided a legitimate
reason for failing to produce witnesses, the district court must then determine if the evidence
which is being proffered in lieu of live testimony bears some indicia of reliability. Farmer, 131
Idaho at 807. The State's reason for not producing witnesses and the reliability of the substitute
evidence must be balanced against the probationer's "right to confrontation under the specific
circumstances in that case."

Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807.
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In this case, the State did not

demonstrate that the distance between the states outweighed Mr. Gray's constitutional right and
his need to confront the adverse witnesses.
As argued by Mr. Gray below, the burden of producing a witness from Wisconsin was
not particularly onerous, arguably just the price of transportation, and the State offered no
evidence of a more significant burden to the State.

(Tr., p.42, Ls.7-25.)

However, the

documentary evidence that the State submitted as substitute for live testimony consisted of layers
and layers ofunswom statements, bearing little to none of the requisite indicia ofreliability. The
State's Report of Violation purports to be based on an unswom written report of Wisconsin
probation officer, which in tum purports to be based on various unswom statements, reporting
unverified events. (See Exhibits, pp.266-76.) These unswom witness statements constituted the
State's substantive evidence against Mr. Gray. The fact these unswom documents were later
received and reviewed by an Idaho probation officer does bestow, retrospectively, meet the
required indicia of reliability. Given this lack of indicia of reliability, the "distance between the
states" cannot outweigh Mr. Gray's right to have the State produce the witnesses so that he can
confront them.
D.

On Remand, Mr. Gray Is Entitled To A New Evidentiary Hearing
Because the unreliable evidence was allowed in violation of Mr. Gray's due process

rights, the district court's fmding of the probation violation must be vacated. The district court's
order revoking Mr. Gray's probation must likewise be vacated. In the event this Court declines
to vacate the revocation order with instructions that Mr. Gray's probation be reinstated based on
the arguments set forth in Sections I and II, this Court should remand Mr. Gray's case for a new
evidentiary hearing that complies with Mr. Gray's due process right to confront witnesses.

28

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gray respectfully asks this Court to reverse the order revoking his probation and
executing his sentence, and remand his case to the district court with the instruction that his
probation be reinstated. Alternatively, Mr. Gray asks for a new probation revocation
evidentiary hearing that complies with his due process rights, including his right to confront.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2020.
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